The terms disaster and mass casualty incident are often used interchangeably but describe different entities. Both imply a discrepancy between the number of victims and the treatment capacity of the community (3).
A mass casualty incident (MCI) is more limited in scope. The number of casualties in an MCI may strain the hospital or receiving facility, but resources are sufficient to cope without outside support (4). In a disaster, the casualty burden will exceed local capabilities and on-site resources, necessitating support from the outside (5).
A disaster is a catastrophic event that disrupts the societal or community infrastructure to such a degree that extraordinary means are necessary to cope. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) defines a disaster as something that not only disrupts patient care but also increases demands upon the institution's services and disrupts the environment of care (6). As a consequence, the very philosophy of medical care may be altered. Instead of the concentration of nearly limitless resources devoted to the needs of an individual patient, the focus during a disaster becomes doing the greatest good for the greatest number.
These are dynamic, not static, terms. For a 100 bed rural hospital, three motor vehicle casualties may represent an MCI, while the same occurrence would be business as usual for a busy, urban Level I trauma center. Tripling the number of victims would represent an overwhelming challenge for the smaller center, indeed a disaster, while the larger facility would bend but likely accommodate the casualty load.
Disasters may also be classified by their characteristics as well as size. In addition to the number of wounded or radius of the disaster site, common categories include causation, location and duration (Table 1) . Disasters may also be classified by the level of response required (7), although this is a retrospective assessment.
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
The initial response to a disaster will be chaotic. The second phase of the sequence leading to recovery is site clearing and reorganization, followed by search and rescue. The sooner chaos is replaced by the institution of command leadership and reorganization, the more effective the response, and the more lives likely to be saved. This of course requires effective planning and rehearsal for potential disasters. From the vantage point of the hospital, the better the planning and training, the more likely that organization can be re-established in a timely fashion (8). The hospital disaster response will require a wide range of resources. These involve personnel, material, systems and policies. Disaster plan templates, available from major national healthcare organizations, must be tailored to local needs and are inadequate as standalone documents. Key considerations are listed in Table 2 .
At the core of preparedness is risk assessment and risk communication. The first step in preparedness is the completion of a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA), which guides an organization to focus on threats that are most likely and the highest risk. The steps in development of an HVA start with identification of all internal and external threats, followed by an estimation of the probability of a hazard occurring. For each hazard listed, a level of preparedness should be defined, thus identifying areas needing improvement. Such an all-hazards approach builds upon the common elements of potential hazards, while still permitting flexibility and adaptability to meet unique demands (9) .
A functional disaster plan contains points of contact for local partners such as public health agencies, state or county emergency management, police and fire, HAZMAT, shelters and poison control centers. Key to the ability to mount a flexible response is alternative communications and back-up utilities provisions, including back-up power generation.
Communication is among the first casualties of a disaster. Cell phones and landlines may not be reliable, and alternative means such as internet, satellite phone, 800 mHz radio, amateur ("ham") radio and CB radio should be available.
The plan should provide for the possibility that the hospital itself will be part of the disaster scene (10) . Physical plant issues include designation of pre-arranged triage, patient care and isolation or quarantine areas. The likelihood that the facility will be seen as a safe haven may mean that large numbers of uninjured citizens, or the extended families of hospital staff, will seek shelter at the facility.
The plan should address administrative and clerical functions such as mechanisms for patient tracking, dissemination of educational material for both staff and lay public, rumor control and points of contact with the media. An influx of inquiries of worried family members and those looking for friends and relatives should be anticipated. A mechanism to identify children and incapacitated patients is necessary.
Well-intentioned volunteers are both a blessing and a curse. Volunteers flooding the ED can cause significant logistical and security problems. Staff should not be admitted to wander into the triage and treatment areas unless they are trained and have a role. Control of access to the ED and the creation of a staging area funneling staff into the treatment area can help to assign tasks, control flow and provide for an accounting of who is where. Since rapid credentialing of volunteers may be difficult in the midst of an event, the development of a medical reserve corps of volunteers on a local or regional basis may be advisable. Finally, the ability to provide for critical incident stress management services should be incorporated into the plan (11) .
Just because a plan exists on paper does not mean that a hospital is prepared. In fact, production of a seemingly detailed plan may confer a false sense of security and preparedness. A plan that is not based upon valid assumptions, developed in a top-down fashion in isolation from other response organizations in the community, not backed by appropriate resources and not continually trained will be doomed to fail. An often overlooked observation is that the planning process may be more important than the plan itself (1). Involvement in the planning process, and the development of contacts between departments, breaks down barriers and fosters understanding, acceptance, flexibility, and trust. Finally, a robust disaster plan will include provisions to address complacency towards disaster preparedness and "burnout." Realistic plans should take into account salient features learned from accounts of prior disasters. Most victims will not be brought to the hospital by emergency medical services (EMS). In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, only 36 % of patients arrived by ambulance; only 29 % during the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Roughly 7% of patients presenting at hospitals during the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack were transported by EMS. The hospital disaster plan must anticipate such influx of people, many of whom may not be seriously injured. If rapid security is not established to keep this influx out of the hospital, the hospital will quickly be rendered incapable of providing necessary care.
It will be unlikely that adequate decontamination has taken place at the scene if needed. Most victims will arrive within one hour, as scenes frequently clear quickly, but there may be multiple waves of victims, including a wave of injured rescuers. The first wave of victims is generally the least injured and the worried well. Because of poor scene-to-hospital information flow and the short time before first wave arrival, hospitals will likely be unaware of the number of seriously injured patients that can be anticipated in a second wave.
In most cases, victims will not be evenly distributed. For example, after the 1964 Alaska earthquake, nearly all patients were treated at only one of five available hospitals. Nineteen of 22 injured survivors of the 1982 Metrorail crash in Washington D.C. went to one hospital, and the closest geographical hospital to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was swamped while most nearby emergency departments were idle. The overloading of one or two institutions while other nearby facilities are under-utilized will have significant impact on surge capacity. As a corollary, disaster plans should include means for identification of, and transportation to, available secondary treatment facilities, especially for patients who are suitable for delayed medical/surgical care (12) .
Surge capacity is the capability of a hospital to expand its resources to meet a large casualty load without requiring outside help, and is a function of space, equipment and staffing. As such, it is a constantly changing feature, and is not a simple metric. It reflects an ability to accommodate an arrival rate, rather than representing a number of casualties or beds (13) . Bed capacity, often mistaken as surge capacity, is the number of hospital beds minus the number of occupied beds. Based upon Israeli MCI experience, a theoretical, although arbitrary, short notice capacity expansion of 20 % of total bed capacity has been recommended (14) . However, the raw number of hospital beds and occupancy rates is inadequate to estimate surge capacity (15) . Computer modeling (13) demonstrates that a casualty load as high as 4-5 critical patients per hour can be accommodated without impact on the quality of care, and that effective disaster planning can increase this capability. Surge capacity is what can be developed by innovative means under extreme circumstances while still preserving an acceptable level of care. True surge capacity may also require waiver of routine hospital licensure regulations.
THE DISASTER DRILL
The purpose of planning is to develop realistic and practical countermeasures designed to address anticipated problems. Not all problems that emerge from a crisis may be anticipated, however. One of the values of effective and frequent drilling and training is the identification of unrecognized needs, loopholes and plan deficits.
Prior to 9/11, disaster drills were often viewed as obligatory nuisances required to fulfill a JCAHO or other regulatory mandate. They were usually announced, scheduled during slack times, cancelled if the facility was busy, and restricted to a single department or area. "Busy" personnel may have been exempted.
Today, the disaster drill, involving a single institution, has given way to the disaster exercise, which is multidisciplinary and multi-institutional in nature. Drills and exercises are required by JCAHO twice yearly, one internal and one external. They may include limited tabletop components, computer modeling and walk-throughs. They are to be taken seriously and should be viewed in the context of performance improvement for your department and facility.
Drills and field exercises should include a formalized scenario, trained simulated victims, an event controller and observers, use of actual clinical spaces and equipment, and patient flow across treatment areas (16) . Inconvenience is accepted. Provisions for managing overwhelming numbers of patients ("surge capacity") must be planned in advance, including at least a walk through the process of implementation. The main issues for these drills include checking and reinforcing staff familiarity of the plan, refining and developing redundant communication links, maintenance of medical supply caches, and updating of standing orders and operating procedures.
Real-time debriefing is essential. After action analysis, either of a drill or actual event, should be driven by checklists and address the matching of needs to resources: Did you have it? Did you use it? Did it work?
Since hospitals generally maintain only a 1-3 day inventory, and many have "preferred" contracts with the same vendors, careful thought should be given to mechanisms of re-supply and the maintenance of a hospital-based strategic stockpile. In order to avoid waste and unnecessary expense, stockpiled material should be dual-use if possible (17) . Inter-operability with existing equipment and with that of agencies with whom the facility may collaborate is preferable to avoid confusion.
THE HOSPITAL RESPONSE
Core parts of a disaster response are generic regardless of the type of incident. These include confirmation of the information available, data gathering, activating a control station, evacuation of the emergency department of non-critical patients, alert and recall of extra medical and paramedical staff, and designating a triage officer/team. The DISASTER paradigm has been advanced as a framework to systematically address the administrative and clinical issues necessary to disaster management (8) ( Table 3) .
The hospital response requires both an identified individual (a staff position) that may activate a disaster plan coupled with a method to communicate this activation throughout the facility, including staff at home needing recall. Staffing and location of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), identification of incident command personnel, and procedures for facility lock-down and security are among the first steps in any response.
While ambulatory patients are being evacuated from the ED and the triage and resuscitation areas being readied, a larger minor treatment area separate from the main ED should be organized for the first wave, most of whom will have minor or no injuries (18) . Another immediate priority is the establishment of a triage area outside the ED entrance. This triage area should permit continuous patient, ambulance and private vehicle flow, ensure the security of the ED by preventing contaminated or hostile patients (e.g. terrorists with the intent of incapacitating the ED in a 2 nd hit) from entering, and minimize the need for immediate re-triage within the ED.
Impediments to success include poor planning, poor drilling, communication breakdowns, security lapses, and unclear command and control (19) . The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) is an effective organizational model that addresses these potential lapses. The HEICS model, which is being incorporated into FEMA's National Incident Management System (NIMS), comprises a hierarchical system with five major domains (20).
HEICS recognizes the need for a medical facility to continue to function in an orderly fashion despite an MCI or disaster. Indeed, the facility plan should take into account the possibility that one is physically in the middle of the disaster (21) . In order to both react to the community needs, maintain continuity of services and protect the facility, HEICS provides a comprehensive resource management strategy. In essence, it does on a larger scale what trauma teams do on a day-to-day basis.
Key principles in any incident command system or organized response include a common terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, consolidated action plans, manageable span of control and pre-designated areas, and a unified command structure. An example of the HEICS domains and division of functions is shown in Table 4 .
WHY SHOULD SURGEONS BE INVOLVED?
First, disasters and mass casualty incidents are likely to require surgical input and intervention. While the volume of traumatic injuries may be small in some instances, such as flooding, injuries and trauma appear during subsequent phases, for example as homeowners attempt to repair roofs. In other scenarios, such as after a terrorist bombing, traumatic injuries will predominate, with 10-20 % being classified as severe (22) .
In either instance, surgeons should be involved in the planning, development, testing and implementation of their institutional and/or regional disaster plan. Our training includes experience with mass casualty incidents, and surgeons are used to working in teams, under stress and time pressures, and with limited information. Triage decisions are a natural component of the surgical world. Surgeons are action oriented and natural leaders.
Unfortunately, many physicians have limited MCI experience or disaster training, and this can negatively impact a real-world response (23) . While the acceptance of this role by surgeons has not been universal (24) , recent experience utilizing a statewide trauma system model has demonstrated the importance of trauma centers, trauma systems and trauma surgeons in disaster preparedness and response in an all-hazard approach (25) . In planning for an "all-hazards" approach, the surgeon should consider:
• What are the credible threats that my facility must respond to? • Who needs to be involved, both inside and outside my facility? • What response services must my facility provide? • What is the "big picture", and where do I and my facility fit in? • How do we "practice"? • How do we assess my facility's state of readiness? • Who is in charge, and of what? Health sector preparedness can improve response and outcomes. California, with a high preparedness index (2), had a low case fatality rate, approximately one per 100 injuries, from the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes. Kobe, Japan, with mixed levels of preparedness had a case fatality rate of 31 per 100 injuries subsequent to the 1995 earthquake. At the other extreme, the 1988 Armenia earthquake, where there was a low preparedness index, produced a case fatality rate of 137 per 100 injuries.
In summary, the 6 P's of Planning can be summarized simply: Poor Planning Promotes Piss-Poor Performance.
